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PERSPECTIVES

Fairness Outside the Cocoon
Meir Statman
he practice of "spinning" involves investment bankers allocating lucrative shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) to executives they are courting. For example, an investment banker courting the business of Joseph Cayre allocated 100,000 shares of Pixar Animation Studios to him when Pixar went public. Cayre sold the shares that day for a $2 million profit.
Cristina Morgan, the managing director of investment banking at Hambrecht & Quist, sees nothing unfair in spinning. Allocating hot IPOs to corporate executives, according to Morgan, is neither illegal nor immoral. It's a business decision. "What we're talking about is trying to solicit business," said Morgan in an interview with Michael Siconolfi (1997) . "What do you think about taking them out to dinner? What do you think about that? We throw lavish parties with caviar. Is that not trying to influence them, their behavior? I suggest that it is" (p. A1). In such ways, many investment bankers, security analysts, traders, and other finance professionals seem to behave as if they lived in a cocoon.
Finance professionals can take pride in the contributions they make to society by analyzing the value of companies and stocks, linking entrepreneurs with investors, and operating markets that provide liquidity and optimal sharing of risk. Finance professionals favor regulations that promote fairness, but too often they maintain the naive belief that their own perceptions of fairness are shared by all. They are not. James Penrose (1997) reacted to Morgan's defenses as follows: "Are [investment bankers] really unable to see any distinction between a golf outing or a dinner with a favored client and a payoff of several hundred thousand dollars?" (p. A23).
Social norms, including rules of fairness, are rules of behavior enforced by the community. They often make their way into the law. People who violate rules of fairness that are enshrined in the law are punished according to the law, but people who violate rules of fairness that are not enshrined in the law do not escape punishment. Their punishment ranges from injury to their reputation to loss of career and social shunning.
Rules of fairness in the financial markets are an outcome of a process that involves the entire community, not finance professionals alone, and many in the community hold beliefs that are radically different from those of finance professionals. Finance professionals who fail to understand and follow community rules of fairness take risks they would be wise to avoid.
Morgan was punished during the market boom in 1997 for her failure to understand community rules of fairness, so her penalty was light. She lost half her bonus. Following the market bust, on 8 September 2004, Frank Quattrone was sentenced to 18 months in jail. Quattrone, an investment banker at Credit Suisse First Boston, engaged in spinning to "Friends of Frank," a group of executives whose business he courted. A jury found Quattrone guilty of obstruction of justice, but as the Economist ("Friendless Frank" 2004) noted, "Prosecutors began by seeking breaches of securities law before falling back on charges of obstruction" (p. 71).
Obstacles
Finance professionals face both internal and external obstacles to following community rules of fairness. The internal obstacles are these professionals' adherence to a free-market notion of fairness and their belief in clear legal limits. The external obstacle is that the community's perception of finance professionals fluctuates with the times. million compensation that exceeded "reasonable compensation." Grasso saw nothing excessive in his compensation because it was approved by the NYSE board. He wrote, "I did not set my compensation. Instead, the payments now under attack were decided by six different Compensation Committees and Boards of Directors of the Exchange, made up of more than three dozen of the most sophisticated, independent and knowledgeable executives in America. Every decision, every bonus, every contract, was decided by those directors in a series of unanimous votes" (Grasso, p. A18 ).
An editorial in the Wall Street Journal ("Spitzer v. Grasso" 2004) noted that "reasonable" is not a well-defined term, but the writer was not as blind as Grasso to community perceptions of that term: "We'll admit to being as astonished as anyone by how much Grasso was paid, and no doubt his judgment in accepting it all was dreadful" (p. A18).
Andy Kessler (2004) illustrated the "folly" part in another Wall Street Journal op-ed piece. Kessler's fund was allocated some MP3.com shares at $28 per share when Quattrone brought the company public. "I must have owned them for an excruciatingly long 45 seconds," wrote Kessler, "then sold them for $60. . . . So, who was buying this garbage? It was small investors who placed orders with no limits at Fidelity or ETrade or Schwab. These gamblers were the real villains, and the victims. And no, I don't feel bad dumping my shares on them-a fool and his money" (p. A18).
Finance professionals such as Kessler earn money by being clever, and they take pride in it. But cleverness can push them close to the legal line-sometimes over it, where arbitrage turns into theft. Listen to a telephone conversation between two Enron Corporation traders in 2000, during California's energy crisis, as reported by Richard Oppel (2004) :
Tim:
He steals money from California to the tune of about a millionPerson 2: Will you rephrase that?
O.K., he, um, he arbitrages the California market to the tune of a million bucks or two a day.
Further illustration of the perils of coming too close to the legal line is provided by KPMG's tax shelters. Lawful tax shelters are investment strategies that also have tax-avoidance properties. But KPMG's tax shelters were clever tax-avoidance schemes with investment strategies as a ruse. David Johnston (2003) reported testimony by KPMG tax partners before a U.S. Senate panel as follows: "KPMG collected $124 million in fees from 1997 through 2001 for shelters that cost the government at least $1.4 billion in lost revenue, a report by the subcommittee's minority staff members estimated" (p. 3).
Some KPMG partners warned the firm that its tax shelters crossed over the line onto the wrong side of the law, but to no avail. "Mark Watson, a former KPMG technical tax advice partner, repeatedly wrote e-mail messages denouncing several tax shelters as improper, only to be rebuffed by those above him. One e-mail message in 1999 said KPMG used 'stealth reporting' on tax returns to deceive the I.R.S. while another warned that 'we are filing misleading, and perhaps false' tax returns for clients" (Johnston, p. 3) .
Jeffrey Eischeid, a supervising partner at the tax shelter unit, who received these e-mails, insisted that the shelters were legitimate investments, but his memos said otherwise. Senator Carl Levin (D, MI) pressed Eischeid to admit, based on his memos, that KPMG based its fees on taxes avoided rather than on investment returns earned. "The large Senate hearing room fell silent. Finally, Mr. Eischeid volunteered that he had not answered immediately because 'I don't know how to change my answer.' . . . Mr. Levin suggested that the partner 'try an honest answer'" (Johnston, p. 3) .
Finance professionals tend to favor free markets and be suspicious of regulations. In the following telephone conversation, Tom, an Enron trader, provides an extreme example as he rails against regulations imposing price caps on electricity (from Oppel): Not all members of the community favor free markets, however, and the free-market notion of fairness does not underlie all community rules of fairness. The community often judges compensation as excessive even if it is paid willingly, and the community's rules of fairness often protect fools from their folly. For example, buyers of vacuum cleaners, drapes, cabinets, and other products sold at buyers' homes have the right, by law, to cancel a signed contract within a three-day cooling-off period even if they were hot and foolish enough to www.cfapubs.org ©2004, CFA Institute sign a contract. Finance professionals who act as if the free-market notion of fairness trumps all other notions of fairness in the community are likely to garner little sympathy from juries composed of a cross-section of the community.
Finance professionals would like society to make the legal line clear and keep it constant. For example, in a discussion of ethics and its unintended consequences, Robert Arnott (2004) wrote, "Too often, society changes the rules of doing business after the fact and seems to enforce the law unpredictably" (p. 8). Indeed. But to expect otherwise is naive. Society has often changed the rules of business after the fact, and it often enforces the law unpredictably. Why would it stop now? For example, in August 2004, Judge Janet Bond Arteron ruled that Long-Term Capital Management, the huge hedge fund that collapsed in 1998, violated tax law when it exploited loopholes. Afterward, Myron Scholes, a partner in the fund, was asked by Browning (2004) if exploiting loopholes was legitimate. "No, it was not," replied Scholes. "And it is costly to do so. But, sometimes what is thought to be ethical in one time period is deemed not to be so later on."
Finance professionals must manage the risks of changing rules of fairness as they manage the risks of volatile markets. They must begin by knowing the risks.
The legal line is like a river that stays within its banks when the weather is dry but overflows in storms. Prudent residents build their homes some distance from the river, and prudent finance professionals set their practices some distance from the legal line.
External Obstacles. The external obstacle to meeting community rules of fairness is the fluctuating perception of finance professionals by the community. Investment bankers, security analysts, and other finance professionals are glorified in times of booms only to be vilified when booms go bust. Violations of rules of fairness bring greater punishment after stock market busts than during stock market booms. That was true in the post-1929 bust when Ferdinand Pecora, Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, excoriated finance professionals, and it was true in the post-2000 bust when Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, excoriated finance professionals. Speaking about the professionals of Citicorp, Levin said, "Citicorp knew what Enron was doing, assisted Enron in the deceptions, and profited from their actions" (Timmons 2002, p. 2).
Ronald Alsop (2004) Merrill Lynch's efforts to change public perceptions were hampered by the capitalist, free-market notion of fairness that is more common among finance professionals than in the larger community. Stan O'Neal, Merrill Lynch's CEO, said in an op-ed piece that increased government regulation and derision of business executives as a "bunch of capitalist outlaws" are harming the economy. But O'Neal quickly retracted his words when he realized that they only increased the gulf between Merrill Lynch and the community. O'Neal said, "I get it, and I believe all of us at Merrill Lynch get it. While we as a company strive to put our clients first, we did not always fully live up to our ideals during this period. We can do a better job, and we will do a better job" (Alsop, p. 217).
Kessler described Quattrone, the spinning investment banker at Credit Suisse First Boston, as "a real life Tom Wolfe-ian Master of the Universe" (p. A18). He was referring to Tom Wolfe's (1987) depiction of Sherman McCoy, the "master of the universe" bond trader in his novel The Bonfire of the Vanities. In the following dialogue from the book, McCoy's wife, Judy, tries to explain to their daughter, Campbell, how bond traders make their money.
[Judy says] "Daddy doesn't build roads or hospitals, and he doesn't help build them, but he does handle the bonds for the people who raise the money."
[Campbell says] "Bonds?"
[Judy says] "Yes. Just imagine that a bond is a slice of cake, and you didn't bake the cake, but every time you hand somebody a slice of the cake a tiny little bit comes off, like a little crumb, and you can keep that." Judy was smiling, and so was Campbell, who seemed to realize that this was a joke, a kind of fairy tale based on what her daddy did.
"Little crumbs?" she said encouragingly.
"Yes," said Judy. "Or you have to imagine little crumbs, but a lot of little crumbs. If you pass around enough slices of cake, then pretty soon you have enough crumbs to make a gigantic cake." Finance professionals are right to point out their important contributions to the community, but they cannot be blind to the fluctuations in the perception of members of the community. Kurtz (2000) described Henry Blodget at the time of the Internet stock boom as follows: "The baby-faced, thirty-three-year-old Merrill Lynch analyst had made his name with a stratospheric prediction for Amazon.com, one that reflected his fiercely bullish view of Net stocks. . . . For months, the visibility, the television stardom, had been great. He was being touted as the 'ax,' Wall Street lingo for someone steel-plated enough to wreck a company" (p. 153). But glorification turned into vilification when the boom went bust. Kurtz wrote, "A few days later, after the Nasdaq has plunged even further, Blodget again defends his stocks on Moneyline. . . . Unfortunately for Blodget, Moneyline flashes his top picks on the screen as he is speaking: eBay, down 67 percent, Amazon, down 60 percent, AOL, down 50 percent, Yahoo!, down 50 percent" (p. 193).
One way to elicit community views on the rules of fairness in financial markets is to use surveys. Surveys have been used to access community views on a wide range of subjects-from the fair punishment for murder to the fair price of snow shovels.
For example, in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding to prohibit executions of mentally retarded criminals, ruled that such executions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." In reaching their decision, the justices considered polls indicating that most people consider such executions unfair. For example, the justices cited a survey by Field Research Corporation in which 74 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement: "Mentally retarded defendants should be given the death penalty when they commit capital crimes." Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986) used surveys to elicit community rules of fairness in prices and wages. They found, for example, that a vast majority of respondents consider it unfair for a hardware store to raise the price of shovels after a snowstorm. I reported (Statman 2004 ) the results of surveys designed to elicit rules of fairness in financial trading. I found, for example, that community rules of fairness are especially strict for people who are well-off; more respondents judged the activities of trading insiders to be unfair when the traders were executives earning $150,000 a year than when they were interns earning $10 an hour.
As noted previously for reports by Alsop, Paul Critchlow, who served as senior vice president for communication and public affairs at Merrill Lynch before being named counselor to the chairman and vice chairman for Public Markets in July 2003, used surveys to assess the community perceptions of his firm.
Navigating Rules of Fairness
Sometimes, people violate rules of fairness when the benefits they will derive from such violations seem to exceed the expected costs. For example, employees of mutual fund companies probably knew they were violating rules of fairness, if not the law, when they engaged in market timing (that is, in-and-out trading) of their own mutual funds and permitted selected others to do so also. Some violators may have thought that the probability of paying for their violations was low enough to make the violations worthwhile. The benefits they derived from such violations were substantial trading profits, which they perceived to outweigh the potential costs if they were caught-fines, loss of career, and jail time.
KPMG's tax partners were quite explicit in their calculation of the costs and benefits of violations. Cassel Bryan-Low (2003) reported that Gregg Ritchie, a KPMG tax partner, noted in an internal memo that the firm would earn $360,000 from each shelter but pay only $31,000 in penalties if a shelter was discovered by the U.S. IRS. It turned out that his accounting was faulty. He neglected to add to the cost column the potential loss of career and perhaps jail time. The same attitude allegedly was the case for Gary Pilgrim and Harold Baxter, the founders of PBHG Funds. Regulators filed accusations of fraud against Pilgrim and Baxter in November 2003, saying that the men allowed two investors to engage in market timing, moving billions of dollars in and out of PBHG funds. Of this practice at PBHG, Reed Abelson and Riva Atlas (2003) wrote, "The trading generated millions of dollars in profit for those investors and the two founders at the expense of the funds' shareholders, according to complaints filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York attorney general, Eliot Spitzer" (p. C1).
The two PBHG founders must have known that market timing shortchanges investors in a fund. In his complaint, Spitzer quoted an e-mail message from Pilgrim saying, "I think timers are a loser for our shareholders. . . . I would give them the boot period" (p. C1). Perhaps Pilgrim and Baxter did not give timers the boot because they thought they were unlikely to be caught or that, if they were caught, the cost of their violations would be small. Sometimes, people violate rules of fairness because they fail to perceive the rules or to understand them, as the Morgan story demonstrates. Despite Pilgrim's memo, Pilgrim and Baxter may not have truly perceived how they were breaking community rules of fairness. Abelson and Atlas www.cfapubs.org ©2004, CFA Institute quoted Don Phillips, an executive with the mutual fund research group Morningstar, as follows: "At heart [Pilgrim and Baxter] didn't see it as inappropriate behavior" (p. C1).
The costs of failure to perceive the rules of fairness and understand that one is violating them can be high. Pilgrim and Baxter were forced to step down from their fund posts and faced legal proceedings that might result in severe fines and worse.
Behavior is regularly judged by today's rules of fairness rather than by the rules in place at the time the behavior occurred, and finance professionals are not the only ones who must contend with changes in the rules of fairness. Barron Lerner (2003) described a debate about the behavior of J. Marion Sims, a 19th-century physician who perfected a surgical procedure by using it on slave women. "Originally lionized as the 'father of gynecology,' Sims was later reviled by a generation of critics as racist and sexist" (p. F7). Similarly, John Hechinger (2003) noted differences between perceptions of market timing today and in the past. "John Brown, head of Putnam's institutional business, noted that trading [the market timing in 2003 that some traders were accused of] occurred 3 1/2 years ago, before the current uproar over market timing. 'The world was a different place then,' he said" (p. C13). Indeed, a 2000 list of proposals to improve mutual funds, reported by Aaron Lucchetti (2000) , includes such items as a requirement that funds' names match the securities they own and that management fees be reported in dollars and cents, but it does not mention market timing.
Still, the Putnam fund managers who engaged in market timing were judged by today's rules of fairness. As Hechinger reported, "Charles Haldeman, senior managing director and co-head of investments at Putnam, declined to address whether the six fund managers were fired or had resigned. But he said they would be leaving the company. 'Those people will not be managing money at Putnam,' he said. 'We are in the process of a workout phase'" (p. C13).
Whatever else happens, we can anticipate some changes in rules of fairness and their application.
Rules of fairness not only change from one time to another, but they also differ from one place to another. Lerner wrote that L. Lewis Wall, a Washington University surgeon who often travels to Africa to perform the surgery perfected by Sims, noted that Sims' behavior is judged more favorably in Africa, where the surgery still brings relief to many women. In the United States, advances in care have virtually eliminated the need for the surgery. Regulation of financial behavior also differs from country to country. For example, while laws prohibiting insider trading are common in almost all countries, levels of enforcement vary greatly.
Navigating the rules of fairness is treacherous not only because they change over time and between places but also because the rules are not shared by all members of a community. I found (Statman) that 1 percent of investment professionals rated as unfair the behavior of a trader who applied research (based only on public information) and skill in an analysis of a stock and 28 percent of investment professionals rated as unfair the behavior of a trader who traded following an overheard conversation between executives he knew only from newspaper pictures. Both trades are legal; the legal line is crossed when one gains advantage from information that judges and juries consider to be inside information. But the finance professionals did not perceive these two trades as equally fair. So, professionals cross one dim fairness line when they gain an advantage with research based on public information, and they cross another dim fairness line when the advantage comes from information the professional is lucky to overhear.
The world is even more treacherous because some fairness lines fall below legal lines and because even people who have mastered the law do not always agree on the location of legal lines. I found (Statman) that some respondents rated behavior to be fair even though it crossed the current insider trading legal line. The U.S. Supreme Court continues to decide insider trading cases from time to time because lower courts need guidance in drawing the legal lines.
Some might feel distaste for following rules of fairness uncovered by surveys of the entire community. Shouldn't we follow rules of fairness that are based on fundamental rights? Unfortunately, some rights conflict with other rights, and not all agree on which rights are fundamental. Egalitarian liberals consider the right to food, shelter, education, and health care to be fundamental, even if the provision of this right requires income redistribution, whereas libertarian liberals consider income redistribution to be a violation of fundamental property rights.
Moreover, following rules of fairness that are based on our own notions of fundamental rights is perfectly fine if the rules we set for ourselves are stricter than the rules set for us by the community. But rights-based rules of fairness do not help us when, for example, they permit us to spin IPO stocks to executives whose business we court because we believe that we have a fundamental right to engage in any transaction we wish.
Conclusion
Social norms-rules of behavior enforced by the community-often make their way into the law. People who violate the rules of fairness that have been enshrined in the law are punished according to the law, but people who violate the rules of fairness that are not enshrined in the law do not escape punishment. Their punishment ranges from injury to their reputation to loss of career and social shunning. Rules of fairness in the financial markets involve the entire community as well as finance professionals, and many in the community hold beliefs that are radically different from those of finance professionals.
Finance professionals need to understand and assess the risks of flouting community rules of fairness in the same way they would the risks of derivative securities, global bonds, or commodities. Practitioners who misperceive bond risks place themselves at risk. So do finance professionals who misperceive community rules of fairness. Finance professionals who fail to understand and follow community rules of fairness are taking unnecessary risks they would be wise to avoid. Brosio, Ramie Fernandez, Donald Langevoort, Robert Prentice, Mark Riepe, Hersh Shefrin, and Daniel Statman and 
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